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Detroit filing for bankruptcy had significant implications for people beyond the residents of the city. There
were consequences for pension beneficiaries and bondholders that call into question the laws that
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governance actually would be brighter if pensions and government obligation bonds can be restructured,
at least a little, in bankruptcy.
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The Education of Detroit’s
Pension and Bond Creditors

brief in brief
• The example of Detroit raises the question
of whether state lawmakers should look
for ways to more fully protect pension

David Skeel

beneficiaries and bondholders. Several

The Detroit residents who must wait fifty-eight minutes for a
response to their 911 calls and whose streetlights do not work are
not the only ones who are dazed and confused.
Many of Detroit’s bond and pension holders thought they were nearly certain to
be paid in full, even after Detroit filed for
bankruptcy. But both are almost certainly
mistaken. Bankruptcy judge Steven Rhodes
explicitly stated in his recent ruling upholding Detroit’s eligibility to file for bankruptcy
that the pensions can be restructured, and
this ruling is likely to be upheld on appeal.
The ruling did not directly address the status
of Detroit’s general obligation bonds, but
these creditors too are likely to be forced to
accept considerably less than one hundred
cents on the dollar.
Why are both constituencies likely
to receive so much less than they initially
imagined?
One reason is simply that municipal
bankruptcies are uncommon, and for major
cities unprecedented. Even Rick Snyder,
Michigan’s governor, proclaimed a bankruptcy for Detroit unthinkable only three
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years ago. Because creditors did not expect
even so financially distressed a city as Detroit
to file for municipal bankruptcy, they paid
less attention than they should have to the
possible implications of a bankruptcy filing.
But there is another, more significant
reason for Detroit pension beneficiaries’ and
creditors’ confusion as well. It isn’t just that
bankruptcy is uncommon, and thus wasn’t on
their radar screen. Both pensions and general
obligation bonds have a radically different
status, and much more protection, outside of
bankruptcy than they do when a municipality files for bankruptcy. Both constituencies
seemed to assume that the protection was,
like a diamond, forever. But both constituencies were wrong.
In this Issue Brief, I will describe the
basis for pension beneficiaries’ and bondholders’ beliefs that they are fully protected,
and explain why both are almost certainly
mistaken about the efficacy of these protec-

states that previously did not have special
protections in place have recently taken
steps in this direction.
• Although these protections would spare
future pension beneficiaries or bondholders
the fate of their compatriots in Detroit,
there are two very serious problems with
them.
• First, if these obligations—pensions especially—cannot be restructured under any
circumstances, some U.S. municipalities will be incapable of addressing their
financial distress.
• Moreover, these cities may be forced to
cut back dramatically on services, with
substantial consequences.
• The future of municipal governance actually would be brighter if pensions and
government obligation bonds can be
restructured, at least a little, in bankruptcy.

tions in bankruptcy. I then will describe
recent efforts to protect pensions in Illinois
and bonds in Rhode Island, and argue that
extending these kinds of protections would
be a mistake. Although the uncertainty about
the pensions’ and bonds’ status is inconsistent with basic rule of law expectations, it
also is temporary; and permitting pensions
and bonds to be restructured in bankruptcy
would bring considerable benefits.

The Pension Bombshell
Last June, shortly before Detroit filed for
bankruptcy, Emergency Manager Kevyn Orr
filed a report that served as a rude awakening for many of Detroit’s creditors, including its pension beneficiaries. Orr had been
appointed at the end of March, pursuant to
controversial state provisions that permit
the governor to select an emergency manager who would largely displace the mayor
and city council if a city is in financial distress. Contrary to the trustees of Detroit’s
two major pension funds, who claimed that
the pensions were adequately funded, Orr’s
report estimated that they were underfunded by $3.5 billion. Even more radically,
Orr also insisted that the pensions would
need to be reduced, a step that pension
beneficiaries insisted is impossible under
Michigan law.1
The key to the standoff between
Detroit’s emergency manager and the pension beneficiaries is a provision that was
added to Michigan’s state constitution in
1963. This provision states that accrued
pension benefits “shall not be diminished
or impaired.”2 To pension beneficiaries, the
provision sounds like a trump card assuring that their pensions can’t be touched.
Outside of bankruptcy, they may well be
right.3 And properly funded pensions are
probably protected even in bankruptcy. But
if a city has failed to fully fund its pensions,
the unfunded portion of the pension may be
subject to restructuring in bankruptcy.
How can this conclusion be reconciled
1

I discuss many of the issues in this section more fully in
a white paper prepared a few weeks before the Detroit
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with the Michigan state constitution, with
its very clear promise that pension benefits
“shall not be diminished or impaired?”
The simple answer is that federal law takes
precedence over state law—even state
constitutional law—under the Supremacy
Clause of the U.S. Constitution.4 Because
the U.S. Constitution authorizes Congress
to enact bankruptcy laws, and the municipal
bankruptcy law that Congress has enacted
permits a city to restructure its ordinary
debts, the unfunded portion of a pension
can be restructured even if state law seems
to say pensions are sacrosanct.
Bankruptcy’s overriding of the Michigan constitution may seem problematic at
first glance, but it makes a great deal more
sense once we add two key details. The
first is that it is an exaggeration to say, as
I have just done, that bankruptcy overrides Michigan’s constitution. Michigan’s
prohibition against impairing pensions
was not added with bankruptcy in mind
at all. Prior to 1963, a pension promise
was simply a “gratuity” in Michigan, as
in many other states. A city like Detroit
could withdraw the promise at any time,
even after a school teacher or fireman had
worked for the city for decades and was
about to retire. Michigan lawmakers wanted
to put pension promises on sounder footing,
by making them enforceable contractual
obligations. This does not mean that the
obligation could never be restructured, even
in bankruptcy; it means that a city like
Detroit cannot simply decide to withdraw
its promise. Michigan lawmakers could have
gone further, and forbidden even the most
financially distressed city from filing for
bankruptcy if they had wished to do so. Cities can only file for bankruptcy if their state
consents to municipal bankruptcy filings.
This gave Michigan the power to just say
no. But Michigan has permitted cities to file
for bankruptcy since 1939, shortly after the
first permanent municipal bankruptcy law
was enacted. Indeed, not only did Michigan authorize municipal bankruptcy, but

Indeed, shortly after Detroit filed for bankruptcy, Detroit’s
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unions persuaded a Michigan state court judge to issue

Michigan lawmakers such as Frank Murphy,
the mayor of Detroit and later governor and
then a U.S. Supreme Court justice, were
among the most vigorous advocates for
municipal bankruptcy in the 1930s.
The second key fact is that the Detroit
pensions are likely to be protected to the
extent they are adequately funded. The funds
that Detroit and its employees contributed
to its two major pension funds belong to the
beneficiaries. A court is likely to conclude
that Detroit and Detroit’s other creditors do not have any interest in the funds.
Notice the implication of this: if Detroit
had properly funded its pensions, the pension beneficiaries would not have anything
to worry about. In fact, the same Michigan
constitutional provision that prohibits
the impairment of pensions requires that
the pensions be fully funded each year as
they accrue. Detroit seems to have simply
ignored this constitutional obligation.
I should point out that my comments
about the status of the Detroit pensions are
somewhat speculative. Prior to the recent
decision by Detroit’s bankruptcy judge
holding that Detroit is eligible to file for
bankruptcy, no judge had directly ruled on
the question of whether a pension can be
restructured in bankruptcy. Judge Steven
Rhodes ruled that pensions can indeed
be restructured, and seemed to suggest
that even the funded portion may not be
protected.5 I suspect that he will not go this
far if and when Detroit does in fact propose
a restructuring. But he has made clear that
pensions are not immune from restructuring
in bankruptcy.
The importance of this conclusion cannot be overstated. The Detroit decision is
currently on appeal, and it could quite easily
make its way to the Supreme Court. If the
conclusion that pensions can be restructured
is upheld, other major cities may think
seriously about the bankruptcy option.
Chicago, Philadelphia and other cities face
severe structural deficits, and in each case
by far the most serious problem is poten-

The Supremacy Clause states that the “Constitution, and

guarantee when lawmakers added pension protection to

the Laws of the United States . . . shall be the supreme

the Michigan constitution in 1963, but did not).

bankruptcy judge’s ruling recent eligibility ruling.   David

injunctions designed to prevent Michigan state officials

Skeel, Can Pensions be Restructured in (Detroit’s) Mu-

from pursuing a bankruptcy case.  The bankruptcy judge

Law of the Land.” U.S. Const, Art. VI, sec. 2.

nicipal Bankruptcy, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/

held that the state court orders were unavailing, however,

Opinion Regarding Eligibility, at 80 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Dec

sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2360302.

because state court actions are halted by the filing of a

5, 2013)(noting that the Michigan legislature could have

MICH. Const. ART. XXIV, sec. 9.

bankruptcy case.  

created a property interest, security interest, or state
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See In re City of Detroit, Michigan, Case No. 13-53846,

The legislation was codified as part of the 1988 amendments to the bankruptcy laws.  Public Law No. 100-597
(1988).
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See, e.g, Christian S. Herzeca, Detroit Chapter 9 Pension
Impairment and Special Revenues Pledged to Secure

tially unsustainable pension obligations.
If pensions can be restructured, municipal
bankruptcy may be a solution for an egregiously stressed city. If pensions cannot be
restructured, municipal bankruptcy will offer
little relief, and we are not likely to see any
additional bankruptcy filings by major cities.

General Obligation
Bonds: The Meaning of
Full Faith and Credit
Detroit’s general obligation (GO) bondholders are in an oddly analogous predicament. They too seem to have assumed that
repayment was assured, and that their
apparently fortified status would be recognized in bankruptcy. Like Detroit’s pension
beneficiaries, its bond holders are almost
certainly mistaken.
Why were the holders of GO bonds so
sure they were fully protected? Part of the
answer has nothing to do with the bondholders’ legal status, and everything to do
with the municipal bond market’s assumption that a major city would never file for
bankruptcy, as I mentioned earlier. But the
main reason for GO bondholders’ optimism
about their status is that they are different
than general creditors in several important
respects. Unlike with other debt, such as
the certificates of participation issued when
Detroit issued debt to fund its pensions,
the GO bonds were explicitly approved by
Detroit’s voters. In addition to authorizing
the borrowing, the voters pledged that the
GO debt would be backed by Detroit’s “full
faith and credit.” Shortly before and after
Detroit’s bankruptcy filing, I had conversations with bond market participants who
assured me that the full faith and credit
provision gave GO bonds more protection
than other debt, such as revenue bonds
that are secured by water, sewer or casino
revenues. Unlike revenue bonds, which have
only a limited source of funding, the reasoning went, GO bonds are backed by all of
Detroit’s revenues.

Although there is a certain logic to
these assumptions, the belief that GO bonds
are protected and revenue bonds are vulnerable is upside-down from a bankruptcy
perspective: in bankruptcy, revenue bonds
are protected and GO bonds aren’t. With
revenue bonds, the bankruptcy laws treat the
specified revenue source as truly belonging
to the bondholders, and as securing their
repayment. Unlike most other creditors,
revenue bondholders are explicitly permitted to continue collecting the payments
even during the bankruptcy case, thanks
to a 1988 reform that sought to make sure
that bankruptcy does not interfere with the
payment of revenue bonds.6 GO bonds are
not entitled to any such protection. The “full

“If the decision that Detroit’s
pensions can be restructured is
upheld on appeal, other major
cities may think seriously
about the bankruptcy option.”

faith and credit” protection is not treated
as giving GO bondholders a right to any
particular source of revenue. They are simply
general creditors, and Detroit’s obligations
to them can be restructured just as its obligations to other creditors can be.
Not surprisingly, GO bondholders have
crafted arguments that they too are entitled
to protection. A number of Detroit’s GO
bonds have contractual provisions saying that the bonds are entitled to payment
from all funds legally available to the City,
including ad valorem property taxes. Insurers of some of these bonds are now arguing
that their bonds are actually revenue bonds,
and that they are entitled to all the protections of revenue bonds.7 The insurers have
now filed a motion in the bankruptcy case
asking the judge to set aside Detroit’s ad

valorem taxes for the benefit of the bonds.
Notice that this argument does not
claim that GO bonds are entitled to special
treatment; rather, the insurers are arguing
that the bonds actually are revenue bonds,
not GO bonds. Although the argument is
plausible, at least for the bonds involved in
the suit, the bonds are rather different than
ordinary revenue bonds. They are linked
to particular revenues only in the sense
that Detroit was required to increase its
ad valorem taxes if it did not have enough
funds for payment. Not until bankruptcy
was imminent did the bond insurers suddenly ask for revenues to be segregated on
their behalf. They seem to have hoped that if
they started acting like holders of a revenue
bond, the court might treat them as such.
But it seems more likely that the bankruptcy
court will treat even these GO bondholders
and insurers as general creditors.
Although Detroit’s bondholders and
pension beneficiaries have mixed their legal
arguments with a heavy dose of posturing,
both constituencies seem to have genuinely
believed that the law was on their side, and
that they would be protected even if Detroit
filed for bankruptcy. This is the worst
possible kind of misunderstanding While,
theoretically, it could have been beneficial
for creditors to believe that they have less
protection than they actually have,8 it is
hard to imagine anything good coming of
their exaggerated belief in their own protection. Certainly policymakers did not have
any incentive to signal to bondholders or
pension beneficiaries that their status was
more precarious than they thought.

Should States Enact
Special Protections?
While virtually all large-scale state and
local pensions are significantly underfunded,
the magnitude of the funding gap varies
substantially across geographic areas. In
Figure 1, for example, I display the annual
contribution necessary per household per

General Obligation Bonds, MBS/MONOLINE LITIGA-

were specifically pledged to repay the insured GOs ...

and AIG during their downward spirals cast considerable

TION COMMENTARY FOR SPECULATORS, available

and no authority was granted to apply these tax receipts

doubt on the thesis.

valorem taxes and general fund revenues.”)  A number of

at  http://mbibaclitigtion.blogspot.com/2013/12/detroit-

other than towards the repayment of the insured GOs”).

Efforts recently have been made to raise hundreds of

other states also purport to protect bondholders in vari-

chapter-9-pension-impairment.html (“T]he insured GOs

8
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obligation bonds . . . shall constitute a first lien on . . . ad

I say “theoretically” because I have my doubts. Prior to

millions of dollars to protect Detroit’s pensions and art,

are paid from the levy of ad valorem taxes levied by

the recent crisis, some commentators argued that “con-

but even these funds will not ensure full payment of the

Detroit in connection with the issuance of the insured

structive ambiguity” can be beneficial—even desirable—

pensions.

Code, which every state has adopted, significantly

GOs.   … “[As with] revenue bonds, these tax receipts

in some contexts.  But the behavior of Lehman Brothers

R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-12-1(a) (2011) (“[A]ll general

expanded the kinds of property that can be used as
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ous ways, but Michigan is one of the states that does not.
11

The most recent revision of the Uniform Commercial

year over a 30-year period to bring state and
local (e.g. Detroit or Los Angeles) pensions
into balance. At the high end are states like
New York, Ohio, and California. Interestingly, Michigan is in the middle category.
Given the magnitude of the problem
and the likelihood that pensions and bonds
will be restructured in the Detroit bankruptcy,9 state lawmakers may look for ways
to more fully protect pension beneficiaries
or bondholders. Several states that previously did not have special protections in
place have recently taken steps in this direction and there is every reason to believe that
others will think seriously about following
their lead.
The most important recent state actions
thus far have taken place in Rhode Island
and Illinois. Two years before Detroit filed
for bankruptcy, the Rhode Island legislature enacted a new law purporting to give
general obligation bondholders a lien on all
ad valorem tax and general fund revenues,10
Thus, Rhode Island has created as a matter
of formal state law the same kind of protection some of Detroit’s bondholders claim
their bond contract gives them. The new law
was enacted shortly before Central Falls,
Rhode Island filed for bankruptcy, and was
used to ensure that bondholders were paid
in full.
The first question to ask about this
provision is whether it is enforceable in
bankruptcy. From a legal perspective, there
are several potential issues. First, although
genuine liens are honored in bankruptcy,
liens that apply only in bankruptcy or are
not legitimate liens are not enforceable.
The Rhode Island law is not limited to
bankruptcy but it is debatable whether it
creates a genuine lien. Ordinary liens apply
to particular assets, such as a type of revenue
or property. A lien on “all revenues” doesn’t
have this quality. Given that state law now
permits a creditor to obtain a lien on nearly
any and everything,11 the Rhode Island
law might be upheld. But is a very unusual
“lien,” to say the least.
collateral.  Interestingly, however, “supergeneric” descriptions of the collateral, such as “all the debtor’s assets”
are deemed to be too broad to qualify as creating a lien.  
U.C.C. section 9-108(c).  
12

See, for example, Stephen D. Eide, Quantifying Crowd-
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11 U.S.C. sec. 901(a)(incorporating 1129(b)(1), which

Out, CIVIC REPORT, No. 81 (Oct. 2013).

There is at least one other potential
issue with the Rhode Island law. Under the
Contracts Clause of the U.S. Constitution,
states are not permitted to impair existing
contracts. By giving bondholders special
protection, it is possible (though far from

Figure 1:

right to insist on payment from the state,
even if Detroit restructured its pensions in
bankruptcy.
A simpler way to protect pensions or
bonds would be for the state to prohibit
its municipalities from filing for bank-

REQUIRED INCREASES FOR FULL PENSION FUNDING IN 30 YEARS (PER RESIDENT
HOUSEHOLD, PER YEAR, NO POLICY CHANGE)

$2,000-$2,499
$1,500-$1,999
$1,000-$1,499
$500-$999
$0-$499

Source: R. Novy-Marx and J. Rauh (2012), “The Revenue Demands of Public Employee Pension Promises,”
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w18489.pdf, p. 48

certain) that the Rhode Island law impermissibly impaired the contracts of other
creditors of Central Falls and other Rhode
Island cities, since protecting bondholders made it less likely these other creditors
would be paid.
To my knowledge, no state has purported to create a similar protection for pensions, but Illinois may recently have achieved
a very similar effect. In early December,
Illinois passed legislation designed to reform
its future pension obligations. The legislation
includes provisions authorizing the state’s
pensions to sue the state if their pensions
are not adequately funded, and waving the
state’s sovereign immunity for the purposes
of the litigation. If Michigan had a provision
like this, Detroit’s pensions would have the

prohibits “unfair discrimination”).

ruptcy altogether. If the state does not
permit its cities to file for bankruptcy, the
status of pension or bond obligations will
be subject solely to state law. At least one
state—Georgia—has explicitly forbidden its
municipalities from making use of municipal
bankruptcy. Prohibiting municipal bankruptcy would remove all of the benefits of
bankruptcy, and thus might be seen as too
draconian a corrective. The state also could
change its mind, and remove the prohibition, more easily than it could withdraw a
pension or bond specific protection. But taking bankruptcy off the table is another way
to beef up protection for pensions or bonds.
Although these protections would spare
future pension beneficiaries or bondholders
the fate of their compatriots in Detroit, I

believe there are two very serious problems
with them. First and most important, if
these obligations—pensions especially—
cannot be restructured under any circumstances, some municipalities will be incapable of addressing their financial distress.
Cities can limit their pension promises
to future employees and in some cases
adjust their obligations for not-yet-accrued
benefits to current employees. They also
can cut salaries or even lay off employees to
reduce expenses. But for cities like Detroit
that have unsustainable accrued obligations
to retirees and current employees, none of
these measures is sufficient.
Second, protecting one group of creditors will inevitably inflict pain on other constituencies. If a city is unable to restructure
large portions of its obligations, it may be
forced to cut back dramatically on services
or may be unable to hire new teachers or
police officers. The consequences may be
considerable, and for many constituencies
may be far more severe than if restructuring
were possible. Although I am not aware of
empirical evidence on the cost of lingering financial distress outside of bankruptcy,
commentators have speculated that they
may be substantial.12
Odd as this may sound, doing nothing
is likely to be far better than stepping in to
protect a particular group of creditors. One
of the chief benefits of bankruptcy is that it
distributes the sacrifice of financial distress

more broadly and equitably than is the case
if a city is left to its own devices. Municipal
bankruptcy prohibits “unfair discrimination” against any group of general creditors,
which ensures that each group will receive
roughly comparable treatment.13
A second benefit of bankruptcy is that
it may alter some of the perverse political
incentives that have contributed to many
cities’ financial distress. This is especially
true with pensions. Although there are a
variety of reasons for the current pension
crisis, one of the biggest problems in many
cities has been the absence of genuine bargaining over the terms of pension promises.
Public employees obviously would prefer a
giant pension to a modest one, but so too
would the politicians who ostensibly bargain with them. In some cases, politicians
are part of the same pension system; and
even if they aren’t, they often depend on the
votes of employees who are. If an unsustainably generous pension can be restructured in
bankruptcy, this gives employees much more
of an interest in making sure that the pension promises are realistic, and that pensions
are properly funded.
With GO bonds, the principal objection to bankruptcy is the risk of contagion.
If bonds can be restructured, the reasoning goes, a bankruptcy filing by one city
will have devastating effects throughout
the municipal bond market. The Detroit
bankruptcy suggests that contagion may

be an issue in the short run for cities in
the same state, but it is unlikely to extend
beyond the state borders. After Detroit
filed, other Michigan municipalities faced
a more unforgiving bond market, but there
was very little impact outside of Michigan. This is as one would expect. Detroit’s
bankruptcy filing confirmed that the current
Michigan administration is reluctant to bail
out troubled Michigan cities, information
that has relevance throughout Michigan.
But it is much less relevant beyond Michigan’s borders. And even within Michigan,
the largest effects were very short term,
with several municipalities delaying bond
offerings or accepting larger than expected
interest costs.
Reporters often speculate about
whether a ruling or a case will “set a precedent” for future cases. Make no mistake:
Judge Rhodes’ holding that Detroit’s pensions can be restructured, and the likelihood
that both pensions and general obligation
bonds can be adjusted in the Detroit bankruptcy, are hugely important developments
that are being closely watched by struggling
municipalities throughout the country.
There will be a strong temptation for these
constituencies to seek bankruptcy-proof
protection from their state governments.
This would be unfortunate. The future of
municipal governance would be brighter if
both sets of obligations can be restructured,
at least a little, in bankruptcy.
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